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The Eastern Crisis
In the summer of 1875 the
Christian peasantry of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose in revolt against
their Muslim landlords. The revolt dragged on until the winter; the
Porte appeared unable to control it. On 30 December 1875 Count Andrassy,
Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, proposed in a note a
fair system of government for the rebellious provinces, whereby a just
solution could be found for the peasants' grievances. All the great
powers agreed to align themselves behind Andrassy
except Britain which demurred, and, although eventually agreeing to
Andrassy's
proposals, made no attempt to persuade the Ottoman government to
accept them.
The note, like many other
reform schemes forced on Ottoman Turkey and accepted by the Porte, had
no practical result. Indeed the situation grew worse; consequently
Andrassy and his
Russian opposite number, the elderly Prince Gorchakov, met in Berlin
and devised a memorandum which was along the same lines as the Andrassy
note, but stronger. It was accepted at once by France and Italy, but
this time entirely rejected by Britain. Disraeli, in a phrase of silly
hysteria, complained that the northern powers of Russia, Austria and
Germany were 'asking us to sanction them in putting a knife to the
throat of Turkey, whether we like it or not'.71
The crisis intensified. There
was a rising in Bulgaria in April 1876, which was cruelly put down by
Ottoman irregulars, despatched on orders from Constantinople. Queen
Victoria, apparently troubled by qualms of conscience, wrote of this
incident:
Hearing as we do all
the undercurrent, and knowing as we do that Russia instigated
this insurrection which caused the cruelty of the Turks, it ought
to be brought home to Russia, and the world ought to know
that on their shoulders and not on ours rests the
blood of the murdered Bulgarians!
In fact the rebellion had
been organised by Bulgarian émigrés. In its suppression about
sixty villages were destroyed and 12,000 to 15,000 massacred – men,
women and children, old and young. In one notorious incident 1,200
people had gathered in a church for protection, and had been burnt
alive there.
Immense anti-Turkish
agitation followed the publication of the facts of the atrocities
(which Disraeli insisted on terming 'so-called atrocities'). The
indignation would not die down, even though Disraeli tried to dismiss
it as mere 'coffee-house babble'. Best remembered today of the
expressions of revulsion for what the Turks had done in Bulgaria is
Gladstone's pamphlet The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the
East, which called for the Turkish government to carry itself off
bag and baggage. It did not appear until September 1876, after
the publication of a British Embassy report had persuaded Gladstone
that the allegations were true. The pamphlet sold 200,000 copies in a
month.
The power of popular
agitation over the Ottoman government's repression of the Bulgarian
uprising was by the late summer of 1876 such as to persuade Disraeli
that a conference was needed to discuss the ills of the Ottoman
empire. These at this time were manifold: Serbia had declared war on
Turkey in June, and Montenegro had joined her in early July.
Constantinople was in a state of political turmoil: earlier in the
year the grand vizier and Sheikh ul-Islam (the supreme religious
dignitary in the empire) had been driven from office; then Sultan
Abdul Aziz himself was deposed (30 May). Two weeks later both the
foreign and war ministers were murdered. At the end of August the new
sultan, Murad, who had turned out to be feeble-minded, was deposed,
and his half-brother, Abdul Hamid, was invested as sultan. 'Will he be
a Solyman the Great?' asked Disraeli of the man whose paranoia and
cowardice were to be the main distinguishing feature of Near Eastern
politics for the next thirty years.
So Disraeli decided 'there
must be a conference, ' I hate it', adding I am quite confident we
have managed without it, had it not been for this Bulgarian bogey.
Lord Salisbury was to be British delegate. The conference eventually
met in December 1876 in Constantinople. Its agenda was wholly
concerned with the administration of European Turkey; Armenia had not
yet come under the scrutiny of the powers.
Then – the Turkish
master-stroke: during the conference, on 23 December, the guns boomed
out, and the Ottoman constitution was proclaimed, a liberal and
democratic instrument. The conference was now redundant, the presence
of the powers superfluous: here was the easy way out that Disraeli and
his ambassador,
Elliot, had hoped for. The administrative reforms that the powers were
seeking to impose on the Ottoman empire were now, apparently, being
created by her own political institutions. The powers were disunited;
even the British disagreed amongst themselves. Salisbury requested
that the British fleet be sent to Constantinople to compel the sultan
to introduce reforms; Disraeli refused.
The conference broke up in
late January 1877. Nothing had been achieved; and the Ottoman
constitution, wheeled in at a critical moment, like a gigantic piece
of stage scenery (depicting, perhaps, contented sunlit villages,
fertile valleys) was wheeled out some months later, and the familiar
Ottoman provincial backdrop was visible again, of local tyranny,
extortion, oppression, wrecked homes, burnt fields, homeless refugees.
The lesson of the
Constantinople conference (which none of the powers drew) was that the
Ottoman empire was still a sovereign power. However much Europe,
through her capitulations, her 'spheres of influence' and her
financial involvement might think she controlled Turkey, the Ottoman
government could still over-trump the powers with her own laws and
'assurances', especially if a power such as Britain were only to make
a show of insistence. Whether or not Turkey's laws were sham was at
this stage irrelevant; all she had to do was to convince the powers
until they departed. Once the foreigners had gone, the laws could be
quietly dropped. The powers were enormously reluctant to draw the
conclusion before their eyes about Ottoman Turkey: that the only way
to reform the administration of a Turkish territory was to detach it
from the sovereignty of Turkey. They would not see this, since they
needed a large Turkey to contain their own jealous rivalries, and to
produce as large a return on their investments as possible. The method
that they chose, of trying to impose schemes of reform, was the worst
possible, since it achieved nothing, and only left the wretched
subject peoples more resented and hated by both central and provincial
Ottoman rulers.
Only one power was prepared
to abandon vacuous diplomacy for action.
The Russo–Turkish War of
1877-8
Our faithful and beloved
subjects know the lively interest which we have always devoted to the
destinies of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey. … We made
it pre-eminently our object to attain the amelioration of the
condition of the Christians in the east by means of peaceful
negotiations and concerted action with the great European powers, our
allies and friends. During two years we have made incessant efforts to
induce the Porte to adopt such reforms as would protect the Christians
of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria from the arbitrary rule of the
local authorities. The execution of these reforms followed, as a
direct obligation, from the anterior engagements solemnly contracted
by the Porte in the sight of all
Europe. Our efforts,
although supported by the joint diplomatic representations of other
governments, have not attained the desired end. The Porte has remained
immovable in its categorical refusal of every effectual guarantee for
the security of its Christian subjects, and it rejected the demands of
the conference of Constantinople. … Having exhausted our peaceful
efforts, we are obliged by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to
proceed to more determined action, The sentiment of equity and that of
our own dignity render it imperative. Turkey, by its refusal, places
us under the necessity of having recourse to arms. … We expressed our
intention of acting independently should we deem it necessary, and
should the honour of Russia require it. Today, in invoking the
blessing of God upon our valiant armies, we give them the order to
cross the frontier of Turkey.
With these words Alexander
II, the tsar-liberator, declared war on the Ottoman empire on 24 April
1877. All the Slav peoples looked to Russia for deliverance from
Turkey. But among the Armenians there was not the same unanimity. Some
genuinely feared that if they were annexed by Russia they would be
swallowed by Orthodoxy, despite the statutes by which the Russians
regulated the affairs of the Armenian Church. On the outbreak of the
war, the Armenian patriarch Nerses Varzhabedian issued a pastoral
letter calling on his flock to show loyalty to the Ottoman state, and
to work and pray for an Ottoman victory.
However, there is little doubt that in the
east, at peasant level, the vast majority of the Armenian villagers
wanted an end of the corrupt tyranny which ruled them. Arminius
Vambéry, no lover of the Armenians, made his first journey east in
1862; stopping at a village near Diadin (a few kilometres west of
Bayazet) he saw
how downtrodden the Armenians were. On asking them
why they did not ask assistance of the
governor of Erzerum, [I] was told in reply, 'that the governor himself
was at the head of the thieves. God alone, and his representative on
earth, the Russian tsar, can help us'. And the poor people were
certainly right in this.
The war was disastrous for
Turkey. In Europe Russian forces reached the outskirts of
Constantinople, and in Asia they reached Erzerum. Many observers
believed that the Ottoman empire was on the point of collapse.
Liberals wondered whether Britain was again going to be forced to
shore up an antiquated despotism for dubious strategic and financial
returns. They sought co-operation with Russia in bringing about an
eastern solution.
This, however, was the last
thing that Disraeli and the Queen intended. Some of Disraeli's
utterances bring to mind Trajan campaigning in Asia, driven by a mad
passion for glory and prestige. 'The Empress of India should order her
armies to clear Central Asia of the Muscovites, and drive them into
the Caspian,' he wrote to his sovereign on 22 July 1877. Three weeks
later, at a
Cabinet meeting, he observed
that a British force could be sent to Batum, 'march without difficulty
through Armenia, and menace the Asiatic possessions of Russia'. It was
clear that he would envisage no solution with Russia other than one
based on maximum confrontation.
He did, however, stop short
of actually declaring war on Russia, thereby saving Britain from a
fruitless replay of the Crimean war; though more than once he hinted
to Turkey that there might be British help against Russia. Other than
sending the fleet through the Dardanelles in January 1878 – and
promptly having it ordered out again by the sultan, to the amusement
of the statesmen of Europe – British support for Turkey was merely
verbal and diplomatic.
The Armenians at the Close
of the War
After the fall of Plevna
(Bulgaria) on 11 December 1877, Russian troops advanced onward to the
Ottoman capital; only an armistice, agreed on 27 January 1878 and
signed on the 31st, halted them at Adrianople (Edirne). On the same
day the 'preliminary bases of peace' between the parties were signed.86
Bulgaria was to be autonomous, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia
independent, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were to receive autonomous
administrations. But there was no mention of Armenia, since the
Armenians had not yet made any requests known.
The Armenian leadership
resolved to change this. Although they had been loyal to the Porte at
the start of the war – a position which had served their own interests
– circumstances had changed this. The principal factor was the
behaviour of the Kurdish irregular cavalry, which was in the pay of
the Turkish regular forces commanded by Ahmed Mukhtar Pasha. C. B.
Norman, special correspondent for The Times, wrote on 26 July
1877 that between his camp at Sabatan and Köprüköy (respectively 25
kilometres east and 40 kilometres west of Kars),
I have not seen one Christian
village which has not been abandoned in consequence of the cruelties
committed on the inhabitants. All have been ransacked, many burnt,
upwards of 5,000 Christians in the Van district have fled to Russian
territory, and women and children are wandering about naked.
In other words the Kurds, far
from aiding the Ottoman war effort, had gone on the rampage, looting
and murdering Armenian villagers. (The incidental consequence for the
Ottoman army was near starvation, since many of the Armenians' flocks
and herds, as well as their stores of grain, were pillaged.)
When these actions became
known to the Armenian leaders in Constantinople – they were the
subject of a debate in the Ottoman parliament just before it was
disbanded by the sultan – attitudes shifted. The Turkish government
had permitted the destruction of numerous Armenian villages in the
east; and the Turkish army was being defeated by the Russians. Hence
the Armenian National Assembly authorised the patriarch to send a
delegation to the Grand Duke Nicolas, at his headquarters in
Adrianople. There, through the energetic mediation of Count Ignatyev,
the leading pan-Slavist who was Russian ambassador to Constantinople,
a clause was drawn up for inclusion in the forthcoming peace treaty,
which read:
For the purpose of preventing
oppressions and atrocities that have taken place in Turkey's European
and Asiatic provinces, the sultan guarantees, in agreement with the
tsar, to grant administrative local self-government to the provinces
inhabited by Armenians.
San Stefano and its
Aftermath
But Ottoman Turkey refused to
countenance local self-government. Throughout February 1878
great-power tension was at its height, and the likelihood of and
Anglo–Russian clash of arms most acute. Turkey, although defeated in
the war, could afford to say what was or was not acceptable; and to
the Russians the matter was not sufficiently important for them to
push it at all costs. A visit by the Armenian patriarch himself failed
to convince the Russians of the need to insist on local
self-government. Ultimately, Russia and Turkey agreed on the wording
of the article. In the peace treaty, signed at San Stefano (the modern
Yeshilköy, site of Istanbul's international airport) on 3 March 1878,
article 16 reads:
As the evacuation by the
Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and
which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and
complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between
the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect,
without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local
requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee
their security from Kurds and Circassians.90
Russian territorial
acquisitions in Asia were extensive; in the south, Bayazid and the
vale of Alashkert, as far west as Khorasan; the fortress town of Kars
(captured by the Russians for the third time in 50 years), and
Sarikamish (T.: 'yellow reed'); Olti, and in the north Artvin and the
harbour town of Batum.
As soon as the British
Cabinet received a copy of the treaty (23 March), it opposed it
vigorously, though the Cabinet was far from united on the issues.
Disraeli himself proposed declaring an emergency, putting a force into
the field, and sending an expedition to occupy Cyprus and Alexandretta
(Iskenderun) – specifically with the intention of counterbalancing the
alleged effect of the Russian conquests in Armenia. But the first
systematic attack on
the treaty of San Stefano was made by Lord
Salisbury in his circular of 1 April 1878, the day after he assumed
the office of foreign secretary.
Salisbury attacked every
proposal of the treaty, and demanded that the issues be settled by a
European congress. His opposition to the Russian territorial gains in
Armenia was twofold:
The acquisition of the
strongholds of Armenia will place the population of the province under
the immediate influence of the Power which holds them; while the
extensive European trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia
will, in consequence of the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be
arrested at the pleasure of the Russian government by the prohibitory
barriers of their commercial system.
In reply to Salisbury's
circular Prince Gorchakov, his Russian opposite number, said that the
Russian acquisitions in Armenia possessed only defensive value.
(Strategically speaking, this is undoubtedly correct.) Gorchakov
admitted himself perplexed by the British view on the caravan route
through the vale of Alashkert, saying that it was in contradiction to
former British government assertions that Russian possession of even
Erzerum or Trebizond would not constitute a danger to British
interests. To affirm that, with the vale of Alashkert, Russia would be
in a position to wreck the trade of Europe was to carry distrust to an
extreme.
To resolve the differences of
the great powers, it was decided to hold a congress. It would be at
Berlin, with Prince Bismarck presiding as 'honest broker'. The lines
of the Asiatic frontier between Russia and Turkey were, however,
agreed beforehand. Russia would keep Kars, Ardahan and Batum, but
Alashkert and Bayazid would revert to Turkey (so that Britain could
keep her commercial route intact).
Armenian leaders in
Constantinople had felt their hopes for their people slipping with
time. So an Armenian delegation, headed by ex-patriarch Khrimian, set
out in March to acquaint European capitals with their proposals for
Turkish Armenia. These were, as they had hoped at Adrianople, for some
form of local self-government within the framework of the Ottoman
empire, and for a strengthening of the forces of law and order.97
But the leaders of Europe showed little interest in the cause of the
Armenians – a people who had remained pacific, despite misgovernment.
From April to June the Armenian leaders were in England, and met Lord
Salisbury on 10 May; he gave them no more than platitudinous
assurances.98 British policy had more important things to
deal with than humanitarian matters.
The Congress of Berlin and
the Revelation of the Cyprus Convention
The Armenian delegates
travelled on to Berlin, where the congress opened on 13 June. Their
presence went unheeded, at this last occasion on which the great
Map 4. The Romanov-Ottoman Frontier in Asia,
according to the Treaties of Adrianople, San Stefano and Berlin
powers disposed of the affairs of the Near
East without the presence of the people who actually lived there; and
the Armenians witnessed, in the treaty consequent to the deliberations
of the congress, the final whittling down of their hopes for the
secure and ordered advancement of their people.
There was, however, one bit
of business that the statesmen assembled in Berlin had to dispose of
before their serious discussion could begin. This was the revelation,
which occurred the day after the opening of the congress, that the
British had undertaken a secret bilateral agreement with Turkey,
promising to defend the Asiatic frontier in the event of a Russian
attack, and receiving in return the lease of the island of Cyprus. The
disclosure of the agreement – it was leaked to the press by an
underpaid clerk – proved highly embarrassing for the British
delegation. In the words of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt:
When the congress met in
Berlin in the early summer of 1878, one of the first acts was to take
from each of the ambassadors present a declaration that he came to it
with clean hands – that is to say, free of all secret engagements
between his government and any other government represented at the
congress. This declaration Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury gave
with the rest.
A few days after, however,
the text of the Cyprus Convention was published in London by the
Globe newspaper … The incident was within a little of breaking up
the congress. The French and Russian ambassadors declared themselves
outraged at the English ill-faith, and M. Waddington [the chief French
delegate] went so far as to order his trunks to be packed for leaving
Berlin.
(The situation was only saved
by the intervention of Bismarck, who negotiated a package of
concessions for France, which included giving her a free hand in
Tunis.)
The Cyprus Convention, which
had been signed on 4 June, just five days after Britain and Russia had
agreed on the position of the Asiatic frontier, was of immense
importance as regards both the responsibilities of Britain and the
aspirations of the Armenians for the secure government of Turkish
Armenia. Its two significant paragraphs read:
If Batum, Ardahan, Kars
or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall
be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further
territories of his imperial majesty the sultan in Asia, as fixed by
the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join his imperial
majesty the sultan in defending them by force of arms.
In return, his imperial
majesty the sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms,
to be agreed upon later between the two powers, into the government,
and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the
Porte in these territories.
Britain undertook to
defend Ottoman Turkey (as the cartoon from Punch shows); in
return she obtained not only Cyprus – 'a place of arms in the Levant',
in the words of Sir Stafford Northcote – but also a pledge from the
sultan to 'introduce reforms'. Now, those who have studied former
Ottoman reform schemes might view this new undertaking with
scepticism. In comparison with the undertaking to Russia, as shown in
article 16 of the San Stefano treaty, that to Britain was feeble,
since in the former case there was an army in occupation, whereas
there was no such British force to compel the sultan. And Britain had
never shown much zeal in persuading Turkey to implement reforms.
Despite the apparent manner
in which Britain had eclipsed Russia as the guarantor of reforms in
Asia, the congress found it necessary to include the matter in its
deliberations. At the session of 4 July Lord Salisbury raised the
question of revising the relevant article of the San Stefano treaty.
He was happy about its second half (which laid down that the Ottoman
government would introduce reforms without delay), but could not
accept that the evacuation of Russian troops was to be conditional on
the introduction of the reforms. Russian troops, which to the
Armenians of the provinces were the only guarantee against
lawlessness, were to the British an object of obsessive imperial
jealousy.
Two days later Salisbury
indicated that he was planning to substitute for the guarantee of
Russian military occupation one that said that Turkey would merely
'come to an agreement' with the great powers on the scope and
execution of reforms. Nothing would be done to compel the Porte to
act. Why Ottoman Turkey had to promise to reform both to
Britain alone (in the Cyprus Convention) and to all six great
powers together is puzzling; but to have only the former guarantee
would make Britain's imperial concern embarrassingly plain; and
moreover with the latter, when the reform scheme failed, the British
prime minister could always point to the responsibility of all the
powers, dismissing the Cyprus Convention with a remark such as 'We
cannot say that we are the protectors of Turkey, or that the influence
of a guardian over his ward is one that we can claim to exercise,' –
as Lord Salisbury was to say on 28 June 1889.
The text of the article on
Armenian reforms, which was to become article 61 of the treaty of
Berlin, was agreed on 8 July. It read:
The Sublime Porte undertakes
to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by
Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and
Kurds.
It will periodically
make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will
superintend their application.
This article, together
with the Cyprus Convention, brought the Armenians
no security at all. The
government of Turkish Armenia, if anything, deteriorated after their
signature. In turn, Armenian self-defence groups and revolutionary
societies grew up, provoking heavy retaliation. The most common
British attitude was of studied ineffectualness; and Russia, partly
for internal reasons and partly for the threats from Britain contained
in the Cyprus Convention, refused to go to the aid of Turkish
Armenians.
Expressing its deep
disquiet at the text of article 61 of the treaty, the unheard Armenian
delegation sent a protest note to all the plenipotentiaries, on 13
July, the day the treaty was signed:
The Armenian delegation
expresses its regrets that its legitimate demands, so moderate at the
time, have not been agreed upon by the congress. We had not believed
that a nation like ours, composed of several million souls, which has
not so far been the instrument of any foreign power, which, although
much more oppressed than the other Christian populations has caused no
trouble to the Ottoman government (and, although our nation had no tie
of religion or origin to any of the great powers, yet, being a
Christian nation it had hoped to find in our century the same
protection afforded to the other Christian nations) – we had not
believed that such a nation, devoid of all political ambition, would
have to acquire the right of living its life and of being governed on
its ancestral land by Armenian officials.
The Armenians have just
realised that they have been deceived, that their rights have not been
recognised, because they have been pacific; that the maintenance of
the independence of their ancient church and nationality have advanced
them nothing.
The Armenian delegation
is going to return to the east, taking this lesson with it. It
declares nevertheless that the Armenian people will never cease from
crying out until Europe gives its legitimate demands satisfaction.
Disraeli, for his part,
returned to England to tumultuous cheering crowds. He assured his
adoring public that he had brought 'peace with honour' – a claim
which, in view of the little trouble he had at the beginning of the
congress, needed to be taken with a pinch of salt.
Archbishop Khrimian returned
to Constantinople in deep despondency. Some weeks later he gave a
sermon in the cathedral in which he painted a vivid picture of the
Armenian claimants at Berlin. There, he said, the European diplomats
had placed on the table a 'dish of liberty'. The Bulgarians, Serbs and
Montenegrins had taken their portions of the tasty harissa with
their iron spoons; but the Armenians had only a paper spoon, which
collapsed when they tried to partake.
Within a few
years, as we shall see, Armenians had fashioned iron spoons for
themselves, but the historic chance was past, and the dish of liberty,
proferred to the Balkan people in 1878, was henceforward, like
refreshment to Tantalus, held perpetually out of their reach.
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